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Abstract 
 
Unlike many other species, human beings cooperate even when they do not 
expect direct reciprocation. Indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 
2005) is an evolutionary explanation for this type of cooperation: A helps B, then C 
(someone other than B) helps A when she/he is in need. However, in order to maintain a 
cooperative equilibrium, the system of indirect reciprocity has to solve a difficult 
problem: Two types of defection (i.e. defection by free-riders who refuse to help everyone 
and defection by cooperative players who selectively defect on free-riders) need to be 
distinguished. Although this problem can be solved if cooperative players take into 
account second-order reputation information (i.e. a current partner’s previous partner’s 
reputation), empirical evidence concerning whether people readily utilize such 
information is mixed. Therefore, in the present study, I proposed intention signaling 
strategy (intSIG). IntSIG allows apparent defectors (who selectively defect on other non-
cooperative players) to protect their reputations by abandoning some resource. Hence, 
intSIG depends on defector’s voluntary communication of intention, as well as on the 
intention-reading ability of interaction partners. Evolutionary game analyses and a series 
of computer simulations support the theoretically validity of intSIG as a strategy for the 
evolution of indirect reciprocity. Furthermore, two experiments showed that people 
behaved in an intSIG-like manner. In sum, the present research provides both theoretical 
and empirical support for this strategy. These results underscore the importance of 
intention signaling in human cooperation. 
  
Key words: indirect reciprocity, reputation, costly signaling, intention 
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
 
There are many cooperative species in the world. Eusocial species, such as 
wasp or honeybees, cooperate with their blood relatives and form a well-hierarchized 
society (Batra, 1968; Crespi & Yanega, 1995; Michener, 1969). Some birds even take 
care of their relative chicks that are not their own offspring (Brown, 1978; Hatchwell et 
al., 2004; Hatchwell & Sharp, 2006). Vampire bats give blood sucked from livestock to 
their starving allies (Wilkinson, 1984, 1988). Primates form a stable bond with a 
specific partner through mutual grooming (Seyfarth & Cheney, 1984). Despite these 
rich instances, it can be said that human beings are quite distinct from other species in 
their ability to cooperate with others. The reason is that a system of our cooperation is 
amenable to not only explanations that are applicable in other species’ behavior, but also 
a human-specific principle.  
Biologically, cooperation is defined as incurring cost to confer benefit on others 
(see Nowak, 2012). In evolutionary biology, a behavior that decreases an actor’s fitness 
(an average number of offspring), while increasing a target’s fitness is regarded as 
cooperation. As natural selection is a process to weed out individuals with low fitness, 
such a “wasteful” behavior is supposed to be selected out. This logic would seem to lead 
to selfish (or free-rider) organisms who save the cost of cooperation to easily dominate a 
population at the expense of altruists because of their frugality. To see the actual world, 
however, cooperation is ubiquitous, as mentioned previously. It means that there must 
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be some biological principles solving this paradox: Why does cooperative behavior 
exist? 
The puzzle of the evolution of cooperation has long attracted many great 
minds’ attention. Kin selection theory, which was proposed by Hamilton (1964), was a 
major breakthrough for this puzzle. According to this theory, altruistic behavior toward 
a genetically related individual not only reduces the actor’s fitness, but also indirectly 
enhances his/her fitness by increasing the fitness of the target, who probabilistically 
shares the same genes with the actor. In other words, helping a kin member is equivalent 
to probabilistically helping one’s own genes. Therefore, one’s net fitness (technically 
inclusive fitness) is determined by the direct cost of the altruistic behavior and the 
indirect benefit accruing from it. A highly cooperative community of honeybees and 
helper birds’ behaviors can be accounted for by this principle. On the other hand, 
cooperation beyond relatives, such as the vampire bats’ blood sharing and primates’ 
mutual grooming, cannot be explained by kin selection theory. Instead, cooperation 
within a stable partnership, regardless of partners’ relatedness, is evolvable by direct 
reciprocity, whereby the cost of helping a partner is compensated by the benefit of being 
helped by the partner (Trivers, 1971). Axelrod (1984) formalized this notion as the tit-
for-tat strategy (TFT), in which one cooperates with a partner if she/he cooperated 
previously and refuses to cooperate if she/he refused to cooperate (Axelrod & Hamilton, 
1981; Axelrod, 1984).  
 Unlike other species, the cooperation of human beings appears beyond kinship 
and stable dyadic partnership (Bowles & Gintis, 2011; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; 
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Nowak & Highfield, 2011). We cooperate even with someone whom we have never 
seen before or whom we do not expect to see again, which cannot be explained by kin 
selection theory and direct reciprocity. Taking someone’s lost wallet to a police station, 
donating to poor people who live in a remote country, and engaging in the costly 
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions for future generations are pervasive in our 
society, while no other species have ever been observed to exhibit this level of 
cooperation. Such human-specific cooperation is also haunted by the adaptive problem 
of free-riders; hence, a central purpose of present study is to provide an evolutionarily 
plausible explanation for this behavior. 
 
1.1. Problems with previous models of reputation-based cooperation 
(a) All defectors are not necessarily “bad” 
Even if the cost of cooperation is not recouped by the partner’s reciprocal 
cooperation, altruists may receive the cooperation of someone else because of their good 
reputation, while free-riders may not be chosen as a target of cooperation because of 
their bad reputation. Indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005) is 
a system of cooperation based on this kind of reputation dynamics―A helps B, then not 
B, but C helps A when he/she is in need. This system is implied in a proverb “one good 
turn deserves another,” Accordingly, this reputation-based cooperation possibly enables 
humans to achieve and maintain large-scale cooperation, which is beyond the scope of 
direct reciprocity. Note that this system does not require people to always consciously 
calculate the benefit of acquiring a good reputation. In fact, we often behave 
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altruistically out of unconscious factors, such as emotions. Indirect reciprocity does not 
explain the underlying psychological mechanism of human-specific cooperation but it 
does explain why such form of cooperation evolved (see Tinbergen, 1963).  
 Nowak and Sigmund (1998a, b) first mathematically formalized this concept. 
They showed that cooperative equilibrium is maintained without dyadic reciprocation if 
individuals use the image-scoring strategy (IS), in which a person selectively bestows a 
“good” reputation on cooperative individuals and cooperates only with individuals with 
a good reputation (as noted previously, the word “strategy” does not imply any 
conscious reasoning). In fact, participants without any knowledge of game theory 
behaved in an IS-like manner in experimental games (Bolton, Katok, & Ockenfels, 
2004, 2005; Dufwenberg, Gneezy, Güth, & Van Damme, 2001; Engelmann & 
Fischbacher, 2009; Ernest-Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2011; Jacquet, Hauert, Traulsen, & 
Milinski, 2012; Manfred Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002a, b; Rockenbach & 
Milinski, 2006; Seinen & Schram, 2006; Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Semmann, & 
Milinski, 2007; Wedekind & Braithwaite, 2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000; Yoeli, 
Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013). Furthermore, this tendency was observed even 
among preschool children (Kato-Shimizu, Onishi, Kanazawa, & Hinobayashi, 2013). 
However, the IS has a theoretical flaw that any defection (in terms of game 
theory, “defection” means to “not helping others”) derived from an IS-like manner 
cannot be justified by IS players themselves (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001). Suppose 
that you encounter a person who has a “bad” reputation (i.e., a free-rider). If you are an 
IS player, you will defect on her/him. As a result, you will receive a “bad” reputation 
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because of your uncooperative behavior and will not be helped by other IS players until 
you help someone else and restore your good reputation. For this reason, you are better 
off cooperating with anyone regardless of his/her reputation. Moreover, although the 
possibility that free-riders invade the population is completely removed, the problem 
still remains if there is even a small possibility of errors in executing cooperation 
(Boyd, 1989; Sugden, 1986). In reality, we are exposed to a risk of failure to help by 
accident. Being late for an appointment by oversleeping and passing by a dropped 
wallet or a donation box because of our own pressing business are a few examples. In 
an IS population, not only a free-rider but also just one error causes a chain of 
unfortunate defections ad infinitum, resulting in the breakdown of cooperative 
equilibrium. A core of this problem is that the IS cannot distinguish defection on free-
riders from defection by free-riders. 
(b) Second-order information 
The chain of defection can be solved by the standing strategy (ST) that 
distinguishes two type of defectors: justified defectors and unjustified defectors (Leimar 
& Hammerstein, 2001; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003). If you behave according to IS, 
you withhold help from a “bad” person, but you do not have any exploitative intent. 
This is the defection that ST sees as justifiable, and ST assigns this player a good 
standing. On the other hand, free-riders deny helping everyone. Therefore, if a player 
defects on someone in good standing, this behavior is regarded as unjustified defection 
and she/he will lower their standing to “bad.” Accordingly, using ST, one needs to take 
into account not only its current partner’s standing but also the current partner’s 
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previous partner’s standing (Figure 1). The latter is called second-order information, 
which is quite essential for indirect reciprocity to stabilize cooperation. In fact, Ohtsuki 
and Iwasa’s (2004, 2006) series of exhaustive mathematic analyses revealed that only 
eight (out of 4096 possible) strategies, called the “leading eight,” were able to stabilize 
cooperation. Although ST is one of the eight variants, it is important to emphasize that 
all of them make use of the second-order information to distinguish justified defectors 
from unjustified defectors.  
 
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of the standing strategy (ST). The ST player (the 
donor) withholds help from the lower recipients who defected on a good player in the 
previous round. The ST player helps the upper recipient who defected on a bad player in 
the previous round. 
Recipient
Donor
Recipient’s 
previous opponent
Defect
Defect
Cooperate
(Justify)
Defect
(unjustify)
Bad
Good
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 Although ST is an evolvable strategy in theory, whether people behave in an 
ST-like manner is an empirical issue. If people use ST, it is predicted that they utilize 
second-order information in deciding whether to help someone. However, people who 
participated in experimental games actually did not robustly use ST. Although earlier 
studies reported negative results (Milinski, Semmann, Bakker, & Krambeck, 2001; Ule, 
Schram, Riedl, & Cason, 2009), there are some recent studies reporting positive results 
(Raihani & Bshary, 2015; Swakman, Molleman, Ule, & Egas, 2016).  
Why is empirical evidence not substantially consistent with results of 
theoretical works? This could be because that second-order information is cognitively 
too demanding for people to utilize (Milinski et al., 2001). In fact, we utilize cognitive 
resources miserly on a daily basis (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). Moreover, it is known that 
people do not use all the relevant information to make rational decisions and tend to rely 
on relatively lower-order information in economic games (Ohtsubo & Rapoport, 2006). 
These empirical findings indicate that, even if reputation-assignment system is highly 
refined to achieve indirect reciprocity, a model employing much information for the 
refinement cannot be empirically valid. Therefore, increasing more information appears 
to be an unrealistic solution. 
 
1.2. Reputation maintenance through the signaling of benign intention 
 Note that traditional models in the indirect reciprocity literature have implicitly 
assumed that actors are not involved in the process whereby their reputation is 
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determined. On the contrary, it has been empirically known that people attempt to 
actively manage their impressions of themselves. For example, in Milinski et al.’s 
(2001) experiment, justified defectors subsequently increased their cooperative behavior 
as if they communicated their lack of exploitative intent to other players. Likewise, 
other studies have shown that people who unintentionally treated their partners in an 
unfair manner engaged in apologizing and/or inflicting self-punishment (Ohtsubo & 
Watanabe, 2009; Tanaka, Yagi, Komiya, Mifune, & Ohtsubo, 2015; Watanabe & 
Ohtsubo, 2012). In these instances, although justified or unintentional defectors did not 
explicitly indicate their non-malicious intent, their behaviors implicitly (but reliably) 
indicate that they are not greedy exploiters. Therefore, when justified defectors want to 
communicate their non-malicious intent to recover their reputation, the use of these 
sorts of signals is possibly effective. If people produce such signals to communicate 
their intent in an indirect reciprocity context, they need not bother to use second-order 
information.  
Based on the above argument, in this paper, I propose a new strategy for 
indirect reciprocity, the intention signaling strategy (intSIG). This strategy produces a 
signal when it defects on bad players and regards other signaling defectors as good 
player. In the subsequent chapters, I first introduce the details of this strategy and then 
present an evolutionary game analysis and a simulation study showing that the intSIG is 
theoretically robust. Thereafter, I report the results of two experiments revealing that 
people actually behave in an intSIG-like manner. Through these studies, I would like to 
shed light on an importance of social signals, in particular, how crucial role an active 
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intention signaling plays. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical study 
 
To examine the theoretical validity of intSIG, I conducted an evolutionary game 
analysis and computer simulation. Although they are explained more in detail in the 
following sections, I herein introduce them briefly.  
The main purpose of the evolutionary game analysis is to seek a condition under 
which a free-rider cannot invade in a group consisting of intSIG players. If free-rider does 
so, indirect reciprocation through intSIG cannot evolve. Moreover, another condition 
under which unconditional cooperators cannot invade in the intSIG group is also 
examined. The reason is that those who cooperate with everyone allow free-riders to 
exploit them. Therefore, if unconditional cooperators can increase in the intSIG group, 
the sub-group of unconditional cooperators may allow the invasion of free-riders. 
On the other hand, the purpose of the computer simulation is to examine whether 
the signal option can bring greater payoff for players than second-order information. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, previous studies have suggested that indirect reciprocity is 
evolvable by using second-order information to distinguish justified defectors from 
unjustified defectors (Leimar & Hammerstein, 2001; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004, 2006; 
Panchanathan & Boyd, 2003). Instead, the present study advocates for the superiority of 
using signal option as a plausible explanation for the evolution of indirect reciprocity. 
However, intSIG seems to be a less efficient strategy to achieve cooperative equilibrium 
because players pay a cost not only when they cooperate but also to produce a signal after 
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defection, whereas the ST players pay the cost only when they cooperate. It seems to 
indicate that possibility of an implementation error, which replaces players’ cooperation 
with defection against their will, reducing intSIG players’ payoff more than that of ST 
players. Therefore, I compare the net payoff of players in an indirect reciprocity context 
when they use the signal option with when they use second-order information. Altogether, 
the theoretical robustness of intSIG (it is evolutionarily stable against other major 
alternative strategies and can attain efficient cooperative equilibrium) is demonstrated. 
 
2.1. intSIG in an indirect reciprocity context 
To precisely define intSIG, I first explain the standard indirect reciprocity 
setting: there is an infinitely large population of individuals who engage in a donation 
game. This game consists of multiple rounds, and all players start the game with a good 
standing. In each round, players are randomly paired with one of the other individuals, 
then assigned either the role of a donor or recipient with the same probability, 0.5. To 
avoid direct reciprocation, the pairs of players never meet again. In the next step, donors 
decide whether they want to cooperate with the recipient or not. If they cooperate, they 
incur a cost (c) to confer a benefit (b) on recipients, and otherwise they save the cost 
without any earnings for the recipients (b > c > 0). However, there is a small probability 
(e > 0) of an implementation error whereby each donor fails to cooperate despite her/his 
intention to cooperate. Following the standard definition, erroneous cooperation (donors 
who intend to defect unintentionally cooperate) was not included in the implementation 
error. In addition to these settings, when donors decide whether to help, they are 
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informed of recipients’ reputation. (In the first round, every player has good standing.) 
The reputation information is used by IS players, but not by unconditional players. IS 
players regard recipients who defected in a previous round as bad players and defect 
against them. On the other hand, ALLC, which always cooperates, and ALLD, which 
always defects, do not utilize any such information. After every donor has made her/his 
decision, the next round will occur with a probability of ω (0 < ω < 1). Therefore, the 
expected number of the rounds in a game is 1 + ω + ω2 + … = 1/(1–ω). 
 Based on these fundamental rules, intSIG can be described as follows. This 
strategy involves basically cooperating with others in good standing unless an 
implementation error occurs and defecting against others in bad standing. However, 
intSIG has another behavioral option. After an implementation error or intentional 
defection, donors subsequently produce a costly signal. If donors emitted the signal 
after defection, they can be regarded as good players by other intSIG players. In other 
words, this signal represents a lack of defectors’ malicious intent. Note that the signal 
must be costly to inhibit free-riders from disguising themselves as cooperative players 
(cf. Grafen, 1990; Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). If the signal 
cost (s) is cheaper than the cooperation cost (c), free-riders can fake the signal to 
maintain good standing. Therefore, the signal cost must be equal to or greater than that 
of cooperation to curtail the incentive to fake the signal.  
Since intSIG players always produce the signal after defection and maintain 
good standing, they are never defected by other intSIG players except when partners 
commit an implementation error. However, if someone who uses some other non-
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signaling strategy defects on a partner for whatever reason, she/he will be regarded as a 
bad player by intSIG players. In sum, in the group of intSIG players, regardless of the 
presence of implementation errors, all players maintain their good standing except some 
mutant players who use non-signaling strategies. Altogether, the payoffs of the two 
players in each round and the donor’s standing in the next round determined by the 
intSIG are summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1  
The Payoff of the Donor and Recipient as a Function of the Donor’s Behavior and 
Standing in the Next Round Determined by intSIG 
Donor’s Behavior Donor Recipient 
Donor’s Standing 
in the Next Round 
Cooperation −c b good 
Defection with a Signal −s 0 good 
Defection without a 
Signal 
(only applied to mutant 
players) 
0 0 bad 
 
2.2. Evolutionary game analysis 
(a) Evolutionary stability 
 Before describing how intSIG works in repeated interactions, I explain the 
evolutionary game analysis of evolutionarily stability (Maynard Smith, 1982; Maynard 
Smith & Price, 1973). This analysis examines the condition under which the focal 
strategy can prevent a rare alternative strategy from invading. Suppose that one invader 
An Intention Signaling Strategy for Indirect Reciprocity   14 
 
(Y) slips into a population of X. Since this population is assumed to be composed of an 
infinitely large number of focal strategies (X), all we have to do is to compare (i) X’s 
payoff when playing with another X and (ii) Y’s payoff when playing with X. If (i) is 
larger than (ii), Y will be eventually weeded out because its fitness is lower than X’s 
fitness in this population. Therefore, it is concluded that the focal strategy is an 
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) against the alternative, invading strategy. In standard 
ESS analyses for the evolution of cooperation, an ALLD (i.e., a free-rider), who defects 
against every other player, and an ALLC, who always cooperates regardless of others’ 
standing, are typical invaders. This is because an ALLD’s invasion destabilizes a 
cooperative equilibrium, and the presence of a subgroup of ALLC can also destabilize 
the cooperative equilibrium by allowing the ALLD to invade the population of a mixture 
of the focal strategy and ALLC. Therefore, in this section, the evolutionary stability of 
intSIG against ALLD and ALLC was tested. 
 
(b) intSIG’s payoff as a focal strategy 
 First, an intSIG player’s payoff when playing with another intSIG player was 
computed. When all group members are intSIG players, one of the players in this group 
in each round earns (1−e)(−c)+e(−s) as a donor (this player cooperates with the 
probability of 1−e, while unintentionally fails to do so and produces the costly signal 
with the probability of e). Because of the costly signal after implementation errors, each 
intSIG player’s standing is always good. Therefore, the intSIG player earns (1−e)(b) as a 
recipient in each round. As the donor and recipient roles are assigned with the same 
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probability, their expected payoff in each round, wSIG can be written as: 
𝑤𝑆𝐼𝐺 =
(1−𝑒)(𝑏−𝑐)−𝑒𝑠
2
  .       (1) 
Since this game continues with the probability of ω, the net payoff of intSIG players is 
WSIG: 
𝑊𝑆𝐼𝐺 =
1
1−𝜔
(1−𝑒)(𝑏−𝑐)−𝑒𝑠
2
  .                                           (2) 
 
(c) intSIG’s evolutionary stability against ALLD 
 In this section, I examined the condition under which intSIG can be stable 
against ALLD. First, an ALLD player’s expected payoff when playing with an intSIG 
player was calculated. Since it is assumed that the frequency of ALLD is negligible, the 
net payoff of intSIG players is written as Eq. (2). 
 When an ALLD player is a donor, it pays 0 because of withhold cooperation 
toward the recipient. When this player is a recipient, she/he earns either (1−e)b when 
her/his standing is good or 0 when it is bad. Let GALLD (t) be the probability that the 
ALLD player is in good standing after t-th round. Since it is assumed that all players are 
in good standing when the game starts, GALLD (0) = 1. The ALLD player’s standing falls 
into bad once assigned to the donor role and never returns to good. Accordingly, an 
ALLD player in good standing will shift to bad standing with the probability of 0.5, 
which is the probability that it will be assigned to the donor role.  
GALLD(t+1) = GALLD(t)×(1/2). 
Therefore,  
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𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐷(𝑡) = (
1
2
)
𝑡
.       (5) 
The ALLD’s payoff in the t-th round, wALLD(t), is calculated by taking account of the 
probability of being in good standing, the probability of being assigned to the recipient 
role, and the benefit conferred by a cooperative donor (the payoff when an ALLD player 
is assigned to the donor role is always 0): 
𝑤𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐷(𝑡) = (
1
2
)
𝑡−1 1
2
(1 − 𝑒)𝑏 =  (
1
2
)
𝑡
(1 − 𝑒)𝑏.    (6) 
Since the next round will occur with the probability of ω, the net payoff of the ALLD is: 
𝑊𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐷 = (
1
2
) (1 − 𝑒)𝑏 +ω (
1
2
)
2
(1 − 𝑒)𝑏 +  ω
2
(
1
2
)
3
(1 − 𝑒)𝑏 + ⋯ 
=  
1
2−𝜔
(1 − 𝑒)𝑏.            (7) 
Based on Eq. (2) and Eq. (7), an ALLD player cannot invade a group of intSIG players 
as far as the following condition holds: 
𝑊𝑆𝐼𝐺 > 𝑊𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐷 
⇔
1
1−𝜔
(1−𝑒)(𝑏−𝑐)−𝑒𝑠
2
 >
1
2−𝜔
(1 − 𝑒)𝑏   
⇔
1−𝑒
𝑒
{(2 − 𝜔)(𝑏 − 𝑐) − 2(1 − 𝜔)𝑏} > 𝑠(2 − 𝜔).   (8) 
In the Eq. (8), if it is assumed that the error rate (e) is small, 
1−𝑒
𝑒
 takes a large positive 
value. Furthermore, the right side of the inequality is always positive (both s and 2−ω 
take positive values by definition). Therefore, Inequality (8) holds if (2 − 𝜔)(𝑏 − 𝑐) −
2(1 − 𝜔)𝑏 > 0. This condition can be reduced as follows: 
𝜔 >
2𝑐
𝑏+𝑐
  .        (9) 
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As b > c, the range of the right side of Inequality (9) is 0 <
2𝑐
𝑏+𝑐
< 1, which corresponds 
to the range of ω. Therefore, Inequality (9) reveals that, when the implementation error 
rate e is small, intSIG is stable against ALLD as far as the game continues with a 
probability greater than 
2𝑐
𝑏+𝑐
. For example, when b = 2 and c = 1, condition (9) only 
requires that the games has to consist of more than 3 rounds on average (i.e., ω > 2/3). It 
is noteworthy that this condition does not depend on the size of the signal cost, s. 
 Remember that the signal cost, s, needs to be equal to or greater than the cost 
of cooperation, c. Substituting c for s in Inequality (8) yields the following condition: 
𝑒 < 1 −
(2−𝜔)𝑐
𝜔𝑏
   .       (10) 
This condition holds when the game continues substantially long. For example, when ω 
is nearly 1, this condition becomes 𝑒 < 1 −
𝑐
𝑏
. Therefore, if the game continues 
substantially long and e is sufficiently small, ALLD cannot invade the group of intSIG 
players. 
 
 (d) intSIG’s evolutionary stability against ALLC 
 I next explored the condition under which intSIG is stable against the invasion 
of ALLC. When there is no possibility of implementation errors, rare ALLC players and 
intSIG players will peacefully co-exist in cooperative equilibrium. However, if the 
possibility of implementation errors is introduced, the payoffs of the intSIG and ALLD 
will diverge because intSIG players can maintain their good standing by producing a 
costly signal, while ALLC players have to wait one donor-round to cooperate and restore 
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their good standing. 
 To obtain the net payoff of ALLC in the intSIG group, let GALLC(t) be the 
probability that ALLC is in good standing after the t-th round. We have GALLC (0) = 1 as 
an initial condition. The ALLC player’s standing becomes bad only when committing an 
implementation error. Therefore, after playing the donor role, her/his standing is good 
with the probability of 1−e. After playing the recipient role, her/his standing does not 
change. Accordingly, the probability that the ALLC player is in good standing after the 
(t+1)-th round is 
𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶(𝑡 + 1) =
1
2
𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶(𝑡) +
1−𝑒
2
   .     (11) 
Subtracting 1–e from the both sides of Eq. (11) yields 
𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶(𝑡 + 1) − (1 − 𝑒) =
1
2
𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶(𝑡) −
1−𝑒
2
  .    (12) 
Let HALLC(t) = GALLC (t)–(1−e), and Eq. (12) can be rewritten as 
𝐻𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶(𝑡 + 1) =
1
2
𝐻𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶(𝑡)  .      (13) 
Notice that HALLC (0) = 1−(1−e) = e. Therefore, 
𝐻𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶(𝑡) = 𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶(𝑡) − (1 − 𝑒) = 𝑒 (
1
2
)
𝑡
  .     (14) 
From Eq. (14), we obtained the probability that the ALLC player is in good standing 
after the t-th round as follows: 
𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶(𝑡) = 𝑒 (
1
2
)
𝑡
+ (1 − 𝑒)  .      (15) 
 Using Eq. (15), the expected payoff of the ALLC at the t-th round can be 
computed. If the ALLC plays the donor role, its payoff is (1−e)( –c) regardless of its 
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standing. If the ALLC plays the recipient role, its expected payoff is (1−e) b when in 
good standing, while the expected payoff is 0 if it is bad. Accordingly, the ALLC’s 
expected payoff at the t-th round is written as 
𝑤𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶(𝑡) = −
1
2
(1 − 𝑒)𝑐 +
1
2
𝑏(1 − 𝑒)𝐺𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶(𝑡 − 1)  
 = (
1
2
)
𝑡
𝑒(1 − 𝑒)𝑏 +
1
2
{(1 − 𝑒)2𝑏 − (1 − 𝑒)𝑐}.   (16) 
From Eq. (16), the ALLC’s net payoff is derived as follows: 
𝑊𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐶 =
1
2−𝜔
𝑒(1 − 𝑒)𝑏 +
1
1−𝜔
(1−𝑒)2𝑏−(1−𝑒)𝑐
2
  .    (17) 
Based on Eq. (2) and Eq. (17), the condition under which intSIG is stable against an 
ALLC (WSIG > WALLC) is derived as follows: 
1
1−𝜔
(1−𝑒)(𝑏−𝑐)−𝑒𝑠
2
>
1
2−𝜔
𝑒(1 − 𝑒)𝑏 +
1
1−𝜔
(1−𝑒)2𝑏−(1−𝑒)𝑐
2
  ,  
which is rewritten as 
(2 − 𝜔)𝑒(1 − 𝑒)𝑏 − (2 − 𝜔)𝑒𝑠 > 2(1 − 𝜔)𝑒(1 − 𝑒)𝑏  .   (18) 
By dividing the both sides of Inequality (18) by e>0, the ESS condition of intSIG 
against an ALLC was further rewritten as below: 
𝑒 < 1 −
(2−𝜔)𝑠
𝜔𝑏
 .        (19) 
Because I divided both sides of inequality by a small number, e, to obtain the condition 
(19), the difference between the net payoffs of intSIG and the ALLC is small. However, 
if condition (19) holds, intSIG is stable against the ALLC. This tends to hold when the 
cost of signal, s, is relatively small compared to the benefit of being helped, b. In other 
words, unlike the ESS condition against an ALLD, which did not depend on the cost of 
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the signal, intSIG is less likely to be stable against an ALLC if the signal cost is large. 
 I further examined condition (19) assuming that the signal cost, s, is equal to 
the cost of cooperation, c. Interestingly, the resultant condition was exactly equal to the 
condition under which intSIG was stable against the invasion of the ALLD, which is 
condition (10) 
𝑒 < 1 −
(2−𝜔)𝑐
𝜔𝑏
 .        (20) 
 
(e) Summary of mathematical analyses 
 I investigated under which condition intSIG is evolutionarily stable against an 
ALLD and ALLC. First, intSIG was stable against an ALLD as far as the interactions 
continue sufficiently long and the stability condition does not depend on the cost of the 
signal. Second, although the intSIG and ALLC players’ expected payoffs were close to 
each other, intSIG was stable against the ALLC when the cost of the signal was not too 
large. When it is assumed that the cost of the signal, s, was equal to the cost of 
cooperation, c, which is a sufficient amount of signaling cost to prevent dishonest 
signalers from undermining the separating equilibrium, it was shown that intSIG was 
stable against both the ALLD and ALLC under exactly the same condition. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the group of intSIG players is evolutionarily stable. 
 
2.3. Computer simulation 
  Additional to the analysis of ESS, I examine whether intSIG is more efficient 
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to achieve a high level of net payoff than ST. IntSIG introduces a signal option into 
players’ behavioral option to solve an enduring problem of indirect reciprocity, which is 
how to distinguish justified defectors from unjustified defectors. On the other hand, ST 
has been proposed by previous studies to solve the same problem by utilizing the 
second-order information to detect the defectors’ type. Due to the costliness of the 
signal, intSIG appears to be less efficient than ST, and if actually so, theoretical validity 
of intSIG relative to that of ST is tarnished to some extent. Accordingly, I conducted a 
computer simulation to directly compare the net payoffs between two groups containing 
either intSIG players or ST players. 
 
(a) Method 
 Similar to the evolutionary game analysis, the donation game was employed to 
compute the net payoff of the groups. The specific settings of the game were as follows: 
There were two groups which consisted of 20 players. One of these groups comprised 
20 intSIG players and another comprised 20 ST players; hence, each group was not a 
mixture of players using different strategies. The cost of cooperation (c) was a constant 
of integral as one, while the benefit of receiving cooperation (b) was a variable ranging 
from 1.1 to 4 (b > c = 1). The probability of an implementation error (e) was a variable 
ranging from 0 to 0.1. Accordingly, I ran a set of simulations of the donation game 
under 7 (b = 1.1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, or 4) × 4 (e = 0, 0.01, 0.05, or 0.1) conditions. 
There were 100 rounds for each donation game. At the end of the one game, a sum of 
the net payoffs of each player in a group was computed. This process was repeatedly 
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simulated 10000 times, and the sum of the net payoff was averaged.  
 As for the intSIG group, when donors fail to cooperate due to an 
implementation error, they immediately produce a signal with a cost. The amount of the 
signal cost (s) was set to be equal to the cooperation cost (s = c = 1). Recall that, 
according to the behavioral and reputation-assignment strategies used by intSIG, players 
acquire bad standing only when they defect without producing a signal. Therefore, in a 
group of intSIG players, no one’s standing falls into bad, and any defection in this group 
is due to an implementation error. 
 On the other hand, according to the behavioral and reputation-assignment 
strategies that ST uses, players acquire bad standing when they defect on recipients in 
good standing, while players maintain their good standing when they defect on 
recipients in bad standing. Cooperation is always regarded as good behavior. Due to an 
implementation error, ST players sometimes fail to cooperate with recipients in good 
standing, and consequently become bad players. Of course, those who defect on the 
recipient with bad standing due to the previous implementation error are considered 
justified defectors, and their standing will not become bad. 
 
(b) Result 
 It is noteworthy that if an implementation error never occurs (e = 0), the 
average net payoffs of an intSIG group and a ST group are equal because players in both 
groups always cooperate throughout the 100 rounds. Therefore, I set the condition when 
e = 0 was a standard, then computed the relative amounts of the net payoff as a function 
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of e and b.  
 The results are shown in Figure 2. In both groups, as the error rate, e, became 
larger, the relative net payoff went down. For the ST group, however, when e was fixed, 
the relative payoff was not changed regardless of b (purple bars). On the other hand, the 
relative payoff of the intSIG group was influenced both by e and b (blue bars). If b was 
small, the relative payoff of the intSIG group was quite less than that of the ST group. 
However, when b was larger than 2, the relative payoff of intSIG outweighed that of the 
ST group regardless of e.  
 These results indicated that if the benefit-to-cost ratio is sufficiently large, intSIG 
is a more efficient strategy to achieve high cooperative equilibrium than ST. Interestingly, 
this difference in efficiency does not emerge until a chance of an implementation error 
exists, which is consistent with real life. However, why did the difference emerge? This 
is possibly because when ST players fail to cooperate, they cannot receive benefits from 
other ST players until they cooperate the next time. On the other hand, when intSIG 
players fail to cooperate, they immediately pay a cost to produce a signal and they can 
obtain benefit from other intSIG players. It means that the potential loss of ST players 
who fail to cooperate depends on the amount of benefit of cooperating, while that of 
intSIG players depends on the amount of the signal cost, which is assumed to be equal to 
the cooperation cost. Therefore, the more the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation 
increases, the larger the difference in the potential loss between ST and intSIG players 
becomes. The simulation results clearly showed that the signal option can preserve the 
chance of benefitting from others’ cooperation more efficiently than using second-order 
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information.  
 
Figure 2. The relative net payoff of the intSIG group and the ST group as a function of 
error rate (e) and the relative amount of benefit (b) to the cost when the net payoff under 
the condition where e = 0 was set to be a standard (100 %). Since the payoffs of the ST 
group was not changed depending on b, they are shown on the left side of the graphs (the 
purple bars). All blue bars indicate the payoffs of the intSIG group. 
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Chapter 3 
Empirical study 
 
 In this chapter, I introduce two experiments examining whether people actually 
behave in an intSIG-like manner in an indirect reciprocity context. Specifically, the 
purpose of the empirical study was to test whether people send signals when they defect 
without malicious intent, and whether to receive other players’ signal as an absence of 
this intent. 
As mentioned earlier, intSIG uses the signal option to distinguish justified 
defectors from unjustified defectors. This option enables intSIG players to solve the 
problem of the chain of defection with which image scoring strategy (IS) has faced. 
Previous studies have proposed the standing strategy (ST) to conquer this problem. ST 
players attend to not only their current partner’s behavior (first-order information) but 
also their current partner’s previous partner’s reputation (second-order information). 
Although theoretical works have shown that ST can maintain a cooperative equilibrium 
in the presence of implementation errors and a few uncooperative players, empirical 
evidence examining whether people actually utilize second-order information is mixed. 
On the other hand, the theoretical validity of intSIG was supported in the studies described 
in Chapter 2, while its empirical validity remains to be demonstrated (Table 2). In addition 
to the verification of intSIG’s empirical validity, I herein also examined whether people 
behave in a ST-like manner to retest the results of related studies (Milinski et al., 2001; 
Swakman et al., 2016). Accordingly, participants played the donation game (Wedekind & 
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Milinski, 2000) either in the signaling condition or the standing condition.  
  
Table 2 
The Properties and the Validity of the Standing strategy and the Intention Signaling 
Strategy 
 
 
Before explaining the details of the two experiments, I explain the rule of the 
donation game, which was common to both experiments. As explained in Chapter 2, each 
round of the donation game consisted of two phases: random pairing and donors’ decision. 
At first, participants were randomly paired with another putative participant and randomly 
assigned to the role of either the donor or the recipient. In fact, participants interacted 
with pre-programed computerized players instead of other participants because real 
interaction may prevent participants from facing every possible type of reputation 
information, which is described later. After the pairing, donors decided whether to give 
the benefit (b) to the recipient while paying the cost (c). Besides, in the signaling condition, 
participants who denied giving b for whatever reason subsequently decided whether to 
Standing Intention Signaling
second-order
information ○ ×
signaling
option × ○
theoretical
validity ○ ○
empirical
validity mixed ？
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abandon c (= to use signal option), which was once kept by denying to give b. In 
consequence, when donors decided to give, they could see the recipients’ previous 
behavior (i.e., reputation information) as three types, “gave,” “did not give + abandoned,” 
and “did not give + did not abandon.” On the other hand, in the standing condition, donors 
were presented with second-order information about the past behavior of their recipients’ 
previous partner. Therefore, donors were exposed to one of the four types of information 
that can be expressed by a combination of first-order information and second-order 
information (Table 3). Since participants in each condition faced every type of reputation 
information throughout the game, the strategies that each participant utilized can be 
estimated. 
Moreover, donors who decided to give b were exposed to a risk that they would 
fail to do it accidentally. If this implementation error occurred, their reputation 
information became “did not give” as long as they immediately abandoned c. This 
indicates that participants who were engaged in the standing condition did not have a 
means to modify their own reputation information after the error except giving b in the 
following rounds.  
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Table 3 
Reputation Information with which Donors Were Presented in the Donation Game of the 
Signaling and Standing Conditions 
 
 
3.1. Hypotheses 
 In the signaling condition, I tested three hypotheses. Hypotheses 1a and 1b are 
about signalers’ behaviors. Hypothesis 2 is about signal receivers’ reaction to the signal. 
Hypothesis 1a is based on the operationalization of three types of defection: an 
“implementation error,” a “justified defection,” and an “unjustified defection.” An 
“implementation error” is a defection replaced with one’s given choice with a computer-
programed probability. A “justified defection” is a refusal to give b to recipients who are 
in bad standing. An “unjustified defection” is the refusal to give b to recipients who are 
in good standing. Ideally, intSIG players always abandon c after an implementation error 
and justified defection, while they never commit an unjustified defection. Therefore, the 
first prediction is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: Participants abandon c more frequently after implementation 
errors and justified defections than unjustified defections.  
 The above classification of defection also allows us to categorize defectors into 
the signaling condition the standing condition
first-order
information
gave,
did not give + abandoned,
did not give + did not abandoned
gave,
did not give
second-order
information × had given,had not given
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two types: “Justified defectors” and “Unjustified defectors”. Justified defectors are 
discriminators who give b to the recipients in good standing but not to the recipients in 
bad standing. Unjustified defectors are free-riders who refuse to give b to the recipients 
regardless of their standing. If justified defectors want to protest that they are different 
from unjustified defectors to maintain their standing, they should abandon c because of 
the absence of second-order information.  
Hypothesis 1b: Justified defectors abandon c more frequently than unjustified 
defectors.  
Even if participants actually use the signal option, cooperative equilibrium cannot be 
achieved unless participants react to others abandoning behavior to distinguish justified 
defection from unjustified defection. Since abandoning is linked to be justified, the 
following hypothesis is derived: 
Hypothesis 2: Participants give b more frequently to other players who gave b 
(“gave”) or refused to give it but abandoned c (“did not give but signaled”) than to players 
who refused both to give b and to abandon c (“did not give”) in the previous round. 
 In the standing condition, donors were faced with recipients with four types of 
reputation information: GG, GN, NG, and NN. Each symbol indicates the combination 
of first-order information (the left side: G or N) and second-order information (the right 
side: G or N), where G represents “gave” and N represents “did not give.” For example, 
the sign GN means that, in the previous round, the current recipient gave b to her/his 
partner who had not given b.  
 If participants distinguish justified defections from unjustified defections based 
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on second-order information, they may regard recipients with information NN as justified 
defectors and recipients with NG as unjustified defectors. Therefore, it can be 
hypothesized that participants give b more frequently to other players whose reputation 
information are GG, GN, and NN than to players whose reputation information is NG. 
On the other hand, if participants do not use second-order information, it is hypothesized 
that participants give b more frequently to other players with information GG and GN 
than to players with information NG and NN. 
 
3.2. Experiment 1 
The matter I have argued thus far is the evolution of human cooperation. It 
assumes that participants would have a tendency to behave in an intSIG-like manner 
prior to the experience. Accordingly, in experiment 1, participants were not informed of 
how their behavior was responded to by other players. The reason is that if they believe 
they will receive a benefit from other players after abandoning c, they may learn that 
using the signal option is effective to maintain good standing. Therefore, the specific 
purpose of experiment 1 is to test the hypotheses described above without the possibility 
of social learning. 
 
(a) Method 
Participants. One hundred seven undergraduates (62 males and 45 females) at Kobe 
University participated in the experiment. The mean±SD of participants’ age was 19.17
±1.09. To recruit participants, they were informed that 500 JPY (a show-up fee) and 
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extra monetary earnings depending on the outcome of experimental game would be paid 
for their participation. In fact, participants were received 1000 JPY as the extra, which 
was beyond the maximum amount they could earn through the game. Three participants 
were dropped from the analyses, as they casted doubt on the presence of other players 
and requested to remove their behavioral data after debriefing.  
Procedure. Experiment 1 was composed of the donation game and post-game 
questionnaire. At first, all participants were guided into a laboratory with six separated 
cubicles where they could not see potential other players, entered one of the cubicles, 
and signed the informed consent form. There was a computer in each stall and 
participants played the donation game with it. To prevent the possibility that direct 
reciprocation would arise, participants were informed that the game would be played 
anonymously. 
Before playing either the signaling condition or the standing condition, 
participants first engaged in the practice session, which was the donation game 
including neither the signal option nor second-order information. This game consisted 
of 50 rounds and participants were not informed prior to remove effects of the shadow 
of the future. Participants were instructed that they would play the game with 5 other 
participants, but they actually interacted with a preset computer program. In each round, 
participants were randomly assigned to either the donor or recipient role. They played 
25 rounds of the game as a donor, and 25 rounds of the game as a recipient. However, 
they inevitably played as the recipient role in the first round, as the recipients in this 
round do not have any behavioral histories. In other words, this setting was intended to 
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prevent participants from reacting to a recipient with no reputation information.  
When participants were assigned to the donor role, they received an 
endowment of 5 JPY and decided whether to “give” it to their recipient or “not give” it 
and retain it for themselves. If participants chose “give,” they would lose 5 JPY and the 
recipient would receive 10 JPY, which was double the donors’ resources (b > c). If they 
chose “not give,” they would keep 5 JPY and the recipient would receive nothing. 
However, their “give” choices were changed to “not give” with the probability of .10. 
Participants themselves immediately knew when this implementation error occurred, 
whereas their current recipient and prospective partners in the following rounds could 
not know whether they made’ “not give” choices intentionally or due to the error. 
Participants understood the presence of the error, but not the specific probability of it. 
Throughout the session, all participants interacted with recipients with “gave” or “did 
not give” histories approximately 13 and 12 times, respectively, so that they could use 
only first-order information. After determining their behavior, participants’ cumulative 
acquired money, which was displayed at the bottom of computer display, was upgraded.  
 When participants were assigned to the recipient role, all they had to do was 
wait for (pseudo) the current donor’s decision. After a few seconds, the pre-programed 
duration ranging from 3 to 10 seconds, the next round started. Note that whether 
participants received 10 JPY from the current donor had to remain unclear to them, as 
this information might allow them to make inferences about what kind of strategies the 
other players were employing. For example, if they received 10 JPY after they had 
chosen “give” and did not receive 10 JPY after they had chosen “not give,” they might 
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infer that other players make their “give” choice contingently on their previous choice. 
Therefore, participants only received an aggregated form of feedback after playing the 
recipient role five times. In other words, after every five rounds when participants were 
assigned to the recipient role, they were informed of cumulative earnings ranging from 
0 (receiving 10 JPY from no donors) to 50 JPY (receiving 10 JPY from every donor). 
Moreover, the amount of this feedback was randomly determined. Hereby, participants 
could not infer the IS-like association between their behavior as the donor role and 
whether they received money as the recipient role. (i.e., If I choose “give” in the current 
round, I will receive 10 JPY from someone else.) When participants received the 
feedback, their cumulative earning on the display was updated. 
 After the practice session, 53 and 54 participants engaged in the signaling 
condition and standing condition, respectively. Participants were instructed on the 
additional rules corresponding to their condition. However, again, they were not 
informed of the exact number of the rounds (100 rounds) to remove effects of the show 
of the future. As with the practice session, the total rounds participants were assigned to 
a donor role and a recipient role were equal (50 rounds, respectively) but to which roles 
they were assigned in each round was randomly determined.  
In the signaling condition, participants as donors could use the signal option 
after “not give” regardless of whether the choice was made intentionally or due to the 
implementation error. In particular, participants were asked whether they would like to 
“abandon” or “not abandon” the 5 JPY that they kept by “not give.” If participants 
chose “abandon,” they would earn nothing in the round. If they chose “not abandon,” 
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they would keep 5 JPY. Therefore, donors were exposed to three patterns of behavioral 
histories, “gave,” “did not give + abandoned,” and “did not give + did not abandon.” In 
the following rounds, they would be assigned to the recipient role. To prevent this 
abandonment from explicitly indicating the signaling behavior, the term “signal” was 
not used in the condition. Participants interacted with recipients with each history 
approximately 25 (“gave”), 13 (“did not give + abandoned”), and 12 times (“did not 
give + did not abandon”). Donors’ choice of whether to abandon 5 JPY or not did not 
affect current recipients’ benefit so that they would receive nothing regardless of their 
current donors chose “abandon” or “not abandon.”  
 In the standing condition, participants as donors were provided the information 
not only about whether a current recipient chose “give” or “not give” (first-order 
information), but also about whether the current recipient’s previous recipient, with 
whom a current recipient had interacted when she/he had been assigned to a donor role, 
had chosen “give” or “not give” (second-order information). This means that donors 
were faced with 2 (current recipient’s “gave” or “did not give” histories) × 2 (current 
recipient’s previous recipient’s “had given” or “had not given” histories) patterns of 
information. Although participants were presented with such information, as mentioned 
above, in this paper, these 4 histories are symbolized as GG, GN, NG, and NN for the 
sake of expedience. The left side of G/N represents “gave”/“did not give” and the right 
side of G/N represents “had given”/“had not given.” Participants interacted with 
recipients with each history approximately 13 (GG), 13 (GN), 12 (NG), and 12 (NN) 
times, respectively. Unlike the practice session and the signaling condition, participants 
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inevitably played the recipient role in the second round as well as in the first round, as 
second-order information was not available in the first two rounds. Note that both the 
signaling condition and the standing condition had an ambiguous feedback setting, 
which was same as the practice session; hence, participants could not infer the intSIG-
like or ST-like association between their behavior as the donor and whether they 
received money as the recipient. 
 After they completed the experimental game, participants were asked to fill out 
a post-game questionnaire about the strategy they used in the game. In the 
questionnaire, participants presented recipients with all possible patterns of histories in 
the given condition and were asked to indicate (a) their impression of the recipient; (b) 
their inference of goodness of recipient’s intention; (c) their hypothetical behavior 
(“give” or “not give”) to the recipient. Participants rated their impression and the 
inferred goodness of recipients’ intention on a five-point scale (1 = “very bad” to 5 = 
“very good”) and stated how they would behave toward the recipient (either “give” or 
“not give”). In addition, participants engaged in the signaling condition were asked to 
indicate their hypothetical decision about the signal option. Participants who chose 
“give” further noted whether they would abandon 5 JPY as a reaction to an 
implementation error, and participants who chose “not give” simply stated whether they 
would abandon 5 JPY (either “abandon” or “not abandon”). After the post-game 
questionnaire, participants were told the purpose and hypotheses of the experiment, 
informed of the presence of deception about pseudo other players and its necessity, and 
given a right to remove their data from analysis. Regardless of their withdrawal to 
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provide their data, all participants received 1500 JPY. 
  
(b) Results 
Cooperation rate in the practice session. Before testing the hypotheses about intSIG 
and ST, I examined whether participants behaved an IS-like manner in the practice 
session. The reason is that, if their tendencies to choose “give” did not differ toward 
recipients with a history of “gave” versus “did not give,” participants might not 
discriminate among recipients depending even on their binary histories. Then, the mean 
cooperation rates toward the recipients with each history (“gave” or “did not give”) 
were computed separately. The result is that participants’ mean cooperation rate was .71 
(SD = 0.30) when the recipients had a “gave” history and .45 (SD = 0.26) when they had 
a “did not give” history. These data were submitted to a 2 (recipients’ history: “gave” vs. 
“did not give”) × 2 (game type: signaling vs. standing) ANOVA including the former 
factor was repeated measure. The analysis showed that the main effect of recipients’ 
history was significant, F1, 102 = 78.07, p < .001, and other effects were not significant. 
These results indicate that participants were more likely to choose “give” toward 
recipients with a “gave” history than recipients with a “did not give” history. More 
importantly, the non-significant effect of the condition implies that the random 
assignment was successful (there was no systematic difference in their cooperativeness 
before receiving any instructions relevant to the experimental conditions). 
Testing hypotheses about intSIG. Then, I examined whether participants used the 
signal option as the intSIG strategy does. I first tested Hypothesis 1a: Participants 
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abandon c more frequently after an implementation error and a justified defection than 
an unjustified defection. Recall that a justified defection means choosing “not give” 
toward recipients in bad standing, and an unjustified defection means choosing “not 
give” toward recipients in good standing. On the basis of the rule of intSIG strategy, we 
operationalized players with a “did not give + did not abandon” history as bad players, 
and players with “gave” or “did not give + abandoned” histories as good players. To 
compute the signaling rate, the numbers of signal options participants used were added 
up from each defection type, and then these total numbers were divided by the sum of 
each defection type in which participants were involved. As a result, the signaling rates 
as a function of defection types were .57 (implementation error), .23 (justified 
defection), and .07 (unjustified defection), respectively (Figure 3). Fisher’s exact test 
with the Bonferroni correction revealed that differences of signaling rates between all 
possible pairs were significant (every p < .017). This means that participants used the 
signal option more frequently after implementation errors and justified defections than 
unjustified defections, and hence Hypothesis 1a was supported. 
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Figure 3. Signaling rate as a function of defection types in the signaling condition of 
experiment 1. 
 
 Second, I tested Hypothesis 1b: Justified defectors abandon c more frequently 
than unjustified defectors. Operationally, unjustified defectors were defined as 
participants who chose “not give” more than 80% of the time when they were paired 
with recipients in good standing (attached to “gave” or “did not give + abandoned” 
histories). Justified defectors were defined as those who were not categorized as 
unjustified defectors and chose “not give” more than 80% of the time when faced with 
recipients in bad standing (attached to “did not give + did not abandon” histories). 
According to these definitions, out of the 52 participants in the signaling condition, 
there were 19 justified defectors whose mean signaling rate was 0.341 (SD = 0.101) and 
13 unjustified defectors whose mean signaling rate was 0.007 (SD = 0.000). As 
predicted, justified defectors used the signal option significantly more often than 
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unjustified defectors (t30 = 3.77, p < 0.001, two-tailed test). 
Finally, Hypothesis 2 was tested: Participants gave b more frequently to other 
players who gave b or refused to give it but abandoned c than to players who refused both 
to give b and to abandon c in the previous round. As with the practice session, the mean 
cooperation rates toward the recipients with each history (“gave,” “did not give + 
abandoned,” or “did not give + did not abandon”) were computed separately. As shown 
in Figure 4, the main effect of recipients’ history was significant (F2,102 = 34.83, p < 0.001), 
and then a post hoc test using Ryan’s method was employed. The results showed that 
participants chose “gave” toward recipients with a “gave” history more often than 
recipients with a “did not give + abandoned” history. More importantly, participants chose 
“gave” toward recipients with “did not give + abandoned” more often than recipients with 
“did not give + did not abandon,” and thus Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
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Figure 4. Cooperation rate as a function of recipients’ histories in the signaling condition 
of experiment 1. The error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
 
Testing hypotheses about ST. For the standing condition, a hypothesis that 
participants behave in an ST-like manner would be supported if they distinguish 
recipients with an NN history (i.e., justified defectors) from recipients with an NG 
history (i.e., unjustified defectors). The main effect of recipients’ history was significant 
(F3,153 = 20.49, p < 0.001). However, a post hoc test using Ryan’s method revealed that 
the mean cooperation rates toward recipients with an NN history (i.e., justified 
defectors) and recipients with an NG history were not significant (Figure 5). This result 
indicated that participants did not chose “give” toward justified defectors more than 
unjustified defectors. In other words, contrary to the prediction from the ST strategy, but 
consistent with the prediction from the IS strategy, participants did not treat the justified 
defectors more favorably than unjustified defectors. 
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Figure 5. Cooperation rate as a function of recipients’ histories in the standing condition 
of experiment 1. The error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
 
Reaction time to recipients’ history. The above results showed that participants were 
likely to use intSIG in an indirect reciprocity context but not likely to use ST. Milinski et 
al.’s (2001) study comparing the empirical validity between IS and ST suggested that 
second-order information is too cognitively taxing for people to use intuitively. If this 
cognitive load determines whether people use a certain strategy, then participants in the 
signaling condition would take less time to make their choice of “give” or “not give” 
than those in the standing condition. To test this prediction, the reaction time (RT) in the 
two conditions were compared. The mean RT was 2.61 seconds (SD = 1.17) in the 
signaling condition and 2.74 seconds (SD = 0.87) in the standing condition. Although 
this pattern followed the prediction, the difference between these two RTs was not 
significant (t102 = 0.61, p = .54, two-tailed test).  
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Post-game questionnaire. The results of the post-game questionnaire indicated a 
consistent pattern with that of the donation game. In the signaling condition, the main 
effects of recipients’ history were significant regarding the impression of the recipient 
(F2, 102 = 90.66, p < .001) and inferred goodness of the recipient’s intention (F2, 102 = 
53.46, p < .001), respectively (Figure 6a, b). A post-hoc test using Ryan’s method 
showed that the most favorable impression and the most benign intention were 
attributed to the recipient with a “gave” history by participants. More importantly, the 
impression and goodness of intention of recipients with “did not give + abandoned” 
history were more favorable than those of the recipient with a “did not give + did not 
abandon” history. 
Hypothetical behavior toward the recipient showed a similar pattern as 
impression and goodness of intention. The proportions of participants who chose “give” 
toward recipients were compared by a series of McNemar tests with the Bonferroni 
correction. As shown in Figure 6c, participants were more cooperative toward the 
recipient with the “gave” history than those with the other histories. More importantly, 
participants were more cooperative toward the recipient with a “did not give + 
abandoned” history than the recipient with the “did not give + did not abandon” history 
(p < .001 for each comparisons). These results indicated that participants interpreted the 
abandonment of 5 JPY after defection as a favorable behavior and a signal of benign 
intention to change their negative reaction toward defectors into altruistic behavior. 
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Figure 6. The results of the post-game questionnaire in the signaling session of 
experiment 1. The error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. (a) Mean impression 
score, (b) mean goodness of intention score, and (c) proportion of participants who 
chose “give” as a function of recipients’ history. 
 
In addition to whether to choose “give,” participants’ hypothetical decision 
about the signal option was analyzed. First, participants’ willingness to choose 
“abandon” as a reaction to an implementation error was assessed. Fifty percent of 
participants reported that they would choose the “abandon” option at least once in the 
three situations (where the recipient was with “gave,” “did not give + abandoned,” and 
“did not give + did not abandon” histories, respectively) after committing an 
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implementation error. Forty-two percent of participants indicated their willingness to 
choose the “abandon” option in all three situations. There were 12 participants who had 
never chosen the “give” option for the three types of recipients. By definition, these 12 
uncooperative participants would never commit implementation errors. Therefore, these 
participants were removed from the analyses. The recalculated proportions of 
participants who chose “abandon” at least once and in all three situations were both 
increased to 65% and 55%. Second, participants’ willingness to choose “abandon” after 
choosing “not give” intentionally was assessed. The proportion of participants who 
chose “not give” toward recipients with all histories (genuine defectors) was too small 
to statistically compare their willingness to use the signal option with that of justified 
defectors, who chose “not give” only toward recipients with a “did not give + did not 
abandon” history. Therefore, I only report that 29% of participants who had chosen “not 
give” toward recipients with a “did not give + did not abandon” history, chose the 
“abandon” option after the “not give” choice. 
In the standing condition, there were several differences between the results of 
the questionnaire and those of the game experiment. The main effect of the recipient 
history was significant, F3, 153 = 94.87, p < .001, and F3, 153 = 41.49, p < .001 for the 
impression of the recipient and the inferred good intention, respectively. Post-hoc tests 
showed that participants’ impression and inferred goodness of intention were more 
favorable when the recipients had GG and GN histories than when recipients had NG 
and NN histories (Figure 7a, b). Moreover, these findings are not consistent with the 
game experiment in which both impression and intention scores were higher in 
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recipients with an NN history than in recipients with an NG history. This result 
suggested that participants discriminated justified defectors from unjustified defectors at 
impression and intention levels. 
 Alternatively, participants appeared not to discriminate between these two 
recipients at the behavioral level, even in the questionnaire (Figure 7c). A series of 
McNemar tests with the Bonferroni correction revealed that the proportion of 
participants who chose “give” toward recipients with GG and GN histories was 
statistically higher than those who chose “give” toward recipients with NG and NN 
histories (p < .001 for each comparisons). More importantly, participants’ willingness to 
choose “give” did not differ toward the recipient with an NG history versus an NN 
history (p = 1.00). In sum of the standing condition, participants regarded the recipient 
with NN more favorably than the recipient with NG, while participants’ hypothetical 
behavior toward them was not distinct from each other. 
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Figure 7. The results of the post-game questionnaire in the standing session of 
experiment 1. The error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. (a) Mean impression 
score, (b) mean goodness of intention score, and (c) proportion of participants who 
chose “give” as a function of recipients’ history. 
 
3.3. Experiment 2 
 To summarize the results of experiment 1, participants were likely to use the 
signal option when they committed an implementation error and justified defection, and 
they perceived other defectors’ signal use as an expression of their benign intention. In 
spite of this supporting evidence, one limitation remains. If they were using intSIG 
precisely in an indirect reciprocity context, participants in the signaling condition of 
experiment 1 should have abandoned their resources after an implementation error as 
frequently as after a justified defection. In fact, participants chose “abandon” after 
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implementation errors more often than after justified defections (see Figure 2). 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 3, participants cooperated with cooperators (“gave”) 
more than with signaling defectors (“did not give + abandoned”), which was not an 
ideal intSIG-like manner. However, it is worth noting that the donation game in 
experiment 1 did not present participants with obvious feedback toward their behavior. 
This indicates that the results in experiment 1 represented participants’ natural tendency 
without social learning. Therefore, it is hypothesized that including an opportunity of 
social learning into the donation game would enhance their intSIG-like tendency shown 
in experiment 1.  
To test this prediction, in experiment 2, participants played the donation game 
in the same manner as in experiment 1, except they were informed whether their 
partners chose “give” or “not give” in every round they were assigned to the recipient 
role. Moreover, this information type practically corresponded to the condition 
participants engaged in. In other words, participants in the signaling condition received 
an intSIG-like response, while those in the standing condition received an ST-like 
response. Thus, whether this explicit feedback would promote participants’ tendency to 
behave in an intSIG- or a ST-like manner was tested.  
 Furthermore, an additional questionnaire containing the Japanese version of the 
Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA) was offered to participants. This questionnaire 
was originally made and developed by Tangney and Dearing (2002) to evaluate 
respondents’ proneness to feel shame, guilt, and some less focal emotions. A recent 
study suggested that shame is an evolved psychological mechanism to limit the spread 
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of information detrimental to one’s reputation (Sznycer et al., 2012). Additionally, 
Tanaka et al. (2015) showed that shame-proneness was positively correlated with 
people’s tendency toward self-punishment, which is analogous behavior with 
abandoning resources demonstrated in experiment 1. Accordingly, whether shame-prone 
people would be likely to choose “abandon” after defection was tested. 
 
(a) Methods 
Participants. One hundred two undergraduates (48 males and 54 females) in Kobe 
University participated in the experiment. The mean±SD of participants’ age was 18.79
±0.96. The announced and actual monetary rewards for participants were the same as 
those of experiment 1. Three participants were dropped from the analyses, as they 
casted doubt on the presence of other players and requested to remove their behavioral 
data after debriefing.  
Procedure. Here, only the procedure that differed from experiment 1 is described. In 
the practice session and the following signaling or standing condition, participants were 
informed of whether they received 10 JPY by the current donor at the end of every 
round they were assigned to a recipient role. If participants received 10 JPY, the 
displayed cumulative earnings were upgraded at the same time. The rule of the feedback 
was programmed as follows. First, an environment was assumed in which there is one 
common strategy most players use. In the experiment, out of five pre-programmed 
players, four players use this common strategy, and other is a genuine defector (using 
ALLD). The common strategy was determined depending on the game participants 
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engaged in. In the practice session, therefore, four pre-programmed players use IS. On 
the other hand, the common strategies were intSIG in the signaling condition, and ST in 
the standing condition. Implementation errors of pre-programmed players were not 
taken into account. Taking the signaling condition as an example, participants who 
chose “abandon” received 10 JPY in the subsequent round were assigned to the 
recipient role four of five times, whereby they could infer the intSIG-like association 
between their behaviors as the donor and whether they received money as the recipient. 
After the experimental game, participants were asked to fill out two post-game 
questionnaires, which were the same as experiment 1 and TOSCA. As with experiment 
1, all participants were debriefed and paid 1500 JPY. 
 
(b) Results 
Cooperation rate in the practice session. In the practice session, participants’ mean 
cooperation rate was .83 (SD = 0.22) toward the recipients with a “gave” history and .65 
(SD = 0.26) toward the recipients with a “did not give” history. A 2 (recipients’ history: 
“gave” vs. “did not give”) × 2 (game type: signaling vs. standing) ANOVA revealed that 
the main effect of recipients’ history was significant, F1, 102 = 58.73, p < .001. Unlike 
experiment 1, however, an interaction effect between the recipients’ history and the 
game type participants engaged in was also significant, F1, 97 = 5.74, p = .019. 
Participants were more likely to choose “give” toward the recipient with a “did not 
give” history in the standing condition (.71, SD = 0.23) than in the signaling condition 
(.58, SD = 0.29). This is an unexpected result because participants were randomly 
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assigned to either condition. Although I could not offer any plausible explanation for 
this interaction, the results largely showed that participants had a tendency to behave at 
least in an IS-like manner. 
Testing hypotheses about intSIG. Hypothesis 1a is about participants’ frequency of 
using the signal option: Participants abandon c more frequently after implementation 
errors and justified defections than unjustified defections. The signaling rates as a 
function of three defection types were .70 (implementation error), .75 (justified 
defection), and .51 (unjustified defection), respectively (Figure 8). Fisher’s exact test 
with the Bonferroni correction showed that participants chose “abandon” more 
frequently after implementation errors and justified defections than after unjustified 
defections (p < .001, for each comparison), which was a consistent pattern to that of 
experiment 1, supporting Hypothesis 1a. More importantly, a difference between the 
signaling rate after implementation errors and justified defections was not significant (p 
= 0.293). Since this difference was significant in experiment 1, the results indicate that 
including feedback made participants’ tendency to use the signal option more similar to 
an intSIG-like manner. 
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Figure 8. Signaling rate as a function of defection types in the signaling condition of 
experiment 2. 
 
 Hypothesis 1b is that justified defectors abandon c more frequently than 
unjustified defectors. In experiment 1, unjustified defectors were defined as participants 
who chose to “not give” more than 80% of the time when they were paired with 
recipients in good standing, while justified defectors were defined as those who were 
not included in unjustified defectors and chose to “not give” more than 80% of the time 
when they were faced with recipients in bad standing. However, in experiment 2, there 
were no participants corresponding to the definition of unjustified defectors. Even if 
80% of the criterion was loosed to 50%, only five participants were identified as 
unjustified defectors. Although it was not a strict analysis because of the small sample 
size, the results of a two-tailed t-test appear to support Hypothesis 1b. The mean 
signaling rate of these unjustified defectors was 0.48 (SD = 0.17), which is less than that 
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of 18 justified defectors (0.82, SD = 0.08): t21 = 2.14, p < 0.044.  
 While Hypothesis 1a and 1b focused on participants’ signaling behavior, 
Hypothesis 2 was about participants’ reaction to others’ signaling behavior: Participants 
gave b more frequently to other players who gave b or refused to give it but abandoned 
c than to players who refused both to give b and to abandon c in the previous round. As 
with experiment 1, the main effect of recipients’ history was significant again (F2,96 = 
31.38, p < 0.001), and a post hoc test using Ryan’s method showed that participants 
chose “give” more frequently toward recipients with “gave” and “did not give + 
abandoned” histories than toward recipients with “did not give + did not abandon” 
history (Figure 9). More importantly, the mean cooperation rates toward recipients with 
“gave” and “did not give + abandoned” histories were not statistically different. This 
result is inconsistent with that of experiment 1, and hence not only Hypothesis 2, but 
also the prediction that the feedback would enhance participants’ intSIG-like manner 
were supported. 
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Figure 9. Cooperation rate as a function of recipients’ histories in the signaling condition 
of experiment 1. The error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
 
Testing hypotheses about ST. In experiment 1, participants did not discriminate 
justified defectors (recipients with an NN history) from unjustified defectors (recipients 
with an NG history). The results of experiment 2 showed a different pattern. The main 
effect of recipients’ history was significant: F(3,147) = 42.180, p < 0.001. A post hoc 
test using Ryan’s method showed that participants chose to “give” toward recipients 
with an NN history more frequently than toward recipients with an NG history (Figure 
10). Although this pattern is consistent with an ST-like manner, the results also revealed 
that participants chose to “give” toward recipients with an NN history less frequently 
than toward recipients with GG and GN histories. This means that participants used 
second-information to discriminate justified defectors from unjustified defectors, but 
not to regard them as favorable as cooperators. 
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Figure 10. Cooperation rate as a function of recipients’ histories in the standing condition 
of experiment 2. The error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. 
 
Reaction time to recipients’ history. In experiment 2, the mean RT of participants’ 
decision of whether to choose “give” were 2.19 seconds (SD = 0.72) in the signaling 
condition and 2.49 seconds (SD = 0.76) in the standing condition. Unlike experiment 1, 
the mean RT was statistically shorter in the signaling condition than in the standing 
condition (t97 = 1.99, p = .049). This result supports the prediction that participants in 
the signaling condition would take less time deciding whether to choose “give” than 
those in the standing condition because of ST’s cognitive load demand. In other words, 
information on recipients’ signal use appears less cognitively taxing than second-order 
information, and thus intSIG was easier to employ for participants than ST. 
Participants’ net payoff. Although the results of the computer simulation showed that 
intSIG is more efficient to achieve cooperative equilibrium than ST unless the benefit-
to-cost ratio is small, it is unclear that whether the results are consistent with those of 
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the experiment. Therefore, the sum of the net payoffs participants earned in the two 
conditions was compared. Contrary to the results of the computer simulation, the mean 
net payoff was significantly smaller in the signaling condition (388.47 JPY, SD = 22.32) 
than in the standing condition (440.00 JPY, SD = 42.47): t97 = 0.48, p = .001, two-tailed 
test. However, in the experiment, participants were faced with the recipients with a “did 
not cooperate + did not abandon” history who were not in the simulation. This setting 
might provide participants in the signaling condition with more opportunities to 
abandon their resources, reducing their net payoff more than that of participants in the 
standing condition. 
Post-game questionnaire. In the signaling condition, the results of the impression of 
the recipients and inferred goodness of recipients’ intention showed identical patterns 
with those of experiment 1 (Figure 11a, b). The main effects of recipients’ history were 
significant regarding the impression of the recipients (F2, 96 = 150.96, p < .001), and 
inferred goodness of recipients’ intention (F2, 96 = 49.40, p < .001), respectively. A post-
hoc test using Ryan’s method indicated that the participants attributed the most 
favorable impression and the most benign intention to the recipient with a “gave” 
history, followed by “did not give + abandoned” and “did not give + did not abandon” 
histories in this order.   
On the other hand, the hypothetical behavior toward the recipients in 
experiment 2 showed a different pattern from that of experiment 1 as well as impression 
and goodness of intention. McNemar tests with the Bonferroni correction revealed that, 
as shown in Figure 11c, the proportion of participants who chose “give” was greater 
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when the recipients had “gave” and “did not give + abandoned” histories than when the 
recipients had a “did not give + did not abandon” history (p < .001 for each 
comparison). More importantly, there was not a statistical difference in the proportion of 
participants who chose “give” between when recipients had a “gave” history versus a 
“did not give + abandoned” history (p < .001). This result is consistent with that of the 
signaling condition of experiment 2 in which participants regarded signaling defectors 
as favorably as cooperators. 
Figure 11. The results of the post-game questionnaire in the signaling session of 
experiment 2. The error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. (a) Mean impression 
score, (b) mean goodness of intention score, and (c) proportion of participants who 
chose “give” as a function of recipients’ history. 
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Regarding participants’ willingness to use the signal option after committing an 
implementation error, 82% of participants noted that they would choose “abandon” at 
least once in three situations of recipients’ histories (“gave,” “did not give + 
abandoned,” and “did not give + did not abandon”) after committing an implementation 
error. The proportion of participants who always chose “abandon” was 76%. In 
experiment 1, these proportions were computed again, removing the data of genuine 
defectors who never committed an implementation error. However, in experiment 2, 
there was only one participant who had never chosen “give,” so this re-calculation was 
not employed. Similarly, it was not tested whether justified defectors, who chose “not 
give” only toward the recipient with a “did not give + did not abandon” history, were 
more likely to choose “abandon” than genuine defectors, who chose “not give” toward 
all recipients. The reason is the same as experiment 1, as the proportion of genuine 
defectors were small. I only reported here that the proportion of justified defectors who 
chose “abandon” was 90%. 
In the standing condition, the results of all items (the impression of recipients, 
inferred goodness of recipients’ intention, and hypothetical behavior toward recipients) 
showed identical patterns to experiment 1 (Figure 12). As for the impression and 
inferred goodness of intention of recipients, the main effect of the recipient history was 
significant, F3, 147 = 111.46, p < .001, and F3, 147 = 58.27, p < .001, respectively. Post-hoc 
tests using Ryan’s method indicated that participants’ impression and the inferred 
goodness of intention of recipients with GG and GN histories were more favorable than 
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recipients with NG and NN histories. More importantly, both impression and intention 
scores were rated higher when recipients had an NN history than when recipients had an 
NG history. Nevertheless, participants’ hypothetical behavior toward the recipients with 
these histories was equally favorable. A series of McNemar tests with the Bonferroni 
correction showed that the proportions of participants who chose “give” toward 
recipients with NG and NN histories were not statistically different (p = 0.052). 
Consistent with experiment 1, although participants might attribute different levels of 
goodness to the recipients with NG and NN histories as different, they appear to react to 
them identically at the behavioral level. 
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Figure 12. The results of the post-game questionnaire in the standing session of 
experiment 2. The error bars indicate standard errors of the mean. (a) Mean impression 
score, (b) mean goodness of intention score, and (c) proportion of participants who 
chose “give” as a function of recipients’ history. 
 
In experiment 2, participants were further asked to fill out the TOSCA, which 
measures respondents’ proneness to feel shame and guilt. Although it was predicted that 
participants’ shame-proneness would positively correlate with their tendency to use the 
signal option, no participants’ behavioral variable in the donation game correlated to the 
score of trait shame and trait guilt. This could be because, in the donation game of 
present study, participants could choose a behavior related to the signal from only 
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binary options (either “abandon” or “not abandon”). In other words, the amount of the 
signal cost in the experiment was fixed. However, in reality, the signal cost to 
communicate benign intention is continuous. If participants choose the amount of the 
signal cost, this amount may correlate with shame-proneness.  
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Chapter 4 
Discussion 
 
 In the two experiments, the availability of the signal option evidently 
influenced participants’ behavior. They voluntarily abandoned their resources after 
committing a defection. This tendency was found even when they were not aware of 
whether other players would favorably react to it (experiment 1), and when they had 
some clues about other players’ favorable reaction to the signal, the tendency was 
facilitated further (experiment 2). It cannot be overemphasized that participants used the 
signal in spite of its costliness. In a dyadic relationship, it has been proven that people 
displayed costly behavior when they unintentionally defected on their partner 
(Watanabe & Ohtsubo, 2012). The results of the present experiments that participants 
abandoned their resources after an unintentional defection is not only consistent with 
this study, but also first demonstrated this costly behavior in an indirect reciprocity 
context, which is beyond dyadic interaction. More surprisingly, the present experiments 
also showed that participants emitted a costly signal when they intentionally defected 
against unjustified defector. Of course, they might do so as a righteous reaction to 
injustice, but is there a necessity for such a person to voluntarily abandon her/his 
resources? There should be if other people do not recognize that she/he behaved 
righteously. This means that participants did not use the signal option simply because 
they intended to express their remorse for defection. Rather, they informed others of 
their benign intention. This suggestion is also supported by another result that 
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participants, as signal receivers, attributed more benign intention to signaling defectors 
than non-signaling defectors and cooperated more frequently with the former. Since the 
evolutionary game analysis and the computer simulation undergird aspects of 
mathematical robustness, it can be concluded that intSIG has both theoretical and 
empirical validities as a strategy for indirect reciprocity. However, this study possesses 
the limitation that participants played games with pre-programmed pseudo players. 
Therefore, whether intSIG spontaneously emerges in real interaction remains to be 
examined.  
 
4.1. The signal option vs. second-order information 
 As for the standing strategy (ST), participants did not used second-order 
information in experiment 1, while they used it to some extent in experiment 2. This 
indicates that participants in experiment 2 learned to behave in an ST-like manner from 
the repetitive ST-like feedback toward their behavior. In other words, participants use 
second-order information as long as other players also use it. This indicates that if 
people naturally behave, as shown in experiment 1, ST is less likely to emerge in real 
interactions than intSIG because people never receive ST-like feedback by others who 
also do not use second-order information prior to learning.  
 This result is not consistent with recent findings that participants tended to 
request second-order information involved with their partners’ previous defection 
(Swakman et al., 2016). However, Swakman et al.’s study also showed that the frequency 
of participants who requested the second-order information and actually behaved in an 
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ST-like manner is smaller than the frequency of those who either did not request the 
second-order information or requested it but failed to adequately use it. One plausible 
speculation is that people unconsciously know that second-order information is useful to 
assess a defector’s intention but it is tough for most of them to interpret such information 
adequately. Although ST regards players who defected on a recipient in bad standing as a 
justified defector, by definition, a set of justified defectors includes unconditional 
defectors (who refuse to cooperate regardless of recipients’ standing). Moreover, second-
order information is less reliable than first-order information because it is less recent than 
first-order information so that it can be distorted through transmission (Panchanathan, 
2011; Swakman et al., 2016). Therefore, second-order information may be indicative of 
defectors’ intention to some extent, but not enough to determine it precisely.  
In addition to empirical findings, the results of the simulation study showed 
that ST is less efficient than intSIG under cooperative equilibrium unless the benefit-to-
cost ratio is small. This is due to the quickness of intSIG’s reputation recovery when 
players defect. As strategies without a signal option, ST should turn a blind eye to 
defection against others’ unintentional failure to cooperate. Therefore, the cooperation 
rate under cooperative equilibrium would be truncated by this “justified” (by a ST-like 
manner) defection, which never occurred in the intSIG group. It is noteworthy that these 
implications apply not only to the standing strategy, but also to every other strategy that 
uses second-order information (Kandori, 1992; Ohtsuki & Iwasa, 2004; 2006; Takahashi 
& Mashima, 2003).  
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4.2. The demanded amount of the signal cost in an empirical context 
 Although the present study confirmed that people behaved in an intSIG-like 
manner, there is another empirical question: what amount of the resource are they 
actually willing to abandon for their reputation? In the evolutionary game analysis, it is 
assumed that the cost of the signal must be at least equal to the cost of cooperation, 
otherwise free-riders can fake the signal at a lower cost. Based on this assumption, in 
experiments 1 and 2, the cost of the signal option was fixed at five JPY, which was 
equivalent to the cooperation cost. Accordingly, if participants can choose not only 
whether to use the signal option, but also what amount of the cost they pay for the 
signal option, the result could deviate from the theoretical expectations.  
At this stage, I do not have a clear-cut prediction regarding this point. 
According to the present study, however, people learn to behave precisely by others’ 
reaction. This suggests that the amount of the cost they pay for the signal option would 
depend on a criterion other people use to infer defectors’ intention. Therefore, if a group 
contains people who are tolerant to low-cost signals, the net amount of the signal cost at 
a group level would be less than the amount of the cooperation cost. Contrary, if there 
are strict signal receivers in the group, a maladaptive consequence of signal inflation 
would result. One possible example of this phenomenon is suicide, which may occur as 
an unfortunate byproduct of costly signaling (Syme, Garfield, & Hagen, 2015). If the 
signal inflation can be demonstrated in the donation game by manipulating group-level 
signal criteria, the further research on intSIG will have applicable implications for some 
practical problems. 
An Intention Signaling Strategy for Indirect Reciprocity   65 
 
 
4.3. Intention signaling as an additional behavioral option 
 In the present study, what was proposed to maintain cooperative equilibrium is 
introducing intention signaling in a repertoire of players’ behavior. As traditional 
indirect reciprocity research has assumed it to be a binary option (either cooperation or 
defection), intSIG might appear to be far from such an ordinal approach. To broaden the 
horizon, however, there are similar theoretical approaches that also expand the 
behavioral option to understand the evolution of cooperation. 
Typical options previous studies have proposed are withdrawing from 
uncooperative players or seeking other favorable partners (Barclay & Raihani, 2016; 
Barclay & Willer, 2007; Fu, Hauert, Nowak, & Wang, 2008; Hauert, De Monte, 
Hofbauer, & Sigmund, 2002; Hauert, Traulsen, Brandt, Nowak, & Sigmund, 2007; Noë 
& Hammerstein, 1994; Pacheco, Traulsen, & Nowak, 2006; Wardil & Hauert, 2014). 
Some recent literature has attempted to introduce such options into the indirect 
reciprocity context. In Ghang and Nowak’s model (2015), each player can decide 
whether to interact with her/his current partner prior to deciding whether to cooperate. 
Withdrawing from interactions with uncooperative players does not sully cooperators’ 
reputation. Regarding partner choice, Roberts (2015) showed that if each donor was 
allowed to keep searching for a partner until she/he met one whose image score satisfied 
her/his criterion, levels of cooperation were higher and more stable than if players were 
randomly paired. Although these options are different from intSIG, all seem to converge 
on a common theme that only deciding whether to cooperate is not sufficient. An 
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additional behavioral option to cooperation/defection enables players to distinguish their 
apparently uncooperative behaviors (e.g., not giving a resource to bad players) from 
genuinely uncooperative behaviors. Only if there is no incentive for genuine defectors 
to use it, any behavior can function to distinguish justified and unjustified defectors. 
The present study set such disincentive as the cost of using the option. 
 
4.4. How can signals emerge? 
 The evolutionary game analysis and the simulation study theoretically support 
the viability of intSIG as strategy for indirect reciprocity. However, both studies were 
conducted under an assumption that every player has an adaptive set of behavioral 
(signaling propensity) and reputation-assignment strategies (propensity to adequately 
respond to the signal). Although a group composed of intSIG players is stable against 
unconditional defector/cooperator and achieves a high level of cooperation, it is still 
unclear how such propensities can emerge in the first place.  
 One possibility is that signaling and signal reading first co-evolved in a direct 
reciprocity context. Mutual cooperation sustained by tit-for-tat players in the iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma is vulnerable to even one implementation error, inducing an endless 
retaliation for partner’s defection (Nowak & Sigmund, 1992). Immediate 
communication of a careless defector’s benign intention could allow tit-for-tat players to 
prevent such unfortunate retaliation. This prevention is beneficial for both the signaler 
and signal reader. Moreover, when players can voluntarily withdraw from the 
uncooperative interaction, a costly signal after an implementation error could also 
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prevent the premature dissolution of potentially beneficial, long-term relationships 
(Ohtsubo & Watanabe, 2009). Therefore, if a once costly signal emerges in the direct 
reciprocity context, it can be applied to the indirect reciprocity context. Another 
possibility is that the ability of signal communication is an evolutionary tributary 
originating from partner choice. Unlike indirect reciprocity, where there is a cost 
associated with helping “good” players, choosy players in a partner choice context do 
not have to incur the cost of choosiness (Barclay, 2013; Raihani & Bshary, 2016; 
Sylwester & Roberts, 2013). Accordingly, the cost-perceiving ability to seek other 
players’ cooperativeness might have first evolved, accompanied by the emergence of 
active cost-incurring behavior. Although the emergence of signal communication seems 
to be a difficult question beyond the theme of this paper, once evolved in some domain, 
it might have been expanded to the indirect reciprocity context. Rather, if human 
communication emerged from social skills, such as cooperation with others (Dunbar, 
1998; Humphrey, 1976; Tomasello, 2010), the theory of intSIG may provide an 
evolutionary explanation of human traits with a new path. 
 
4.5. Conclusion: Human beings are not only a cooperative, but also a 
communicative species 
As noted, a costly signal is just one of many possible behavioral options to 
discriminate justified defectors from unjustified defectors. However, it has a profound, 
specific implication for human sociality.  
There are several theories explaining the evolution of large-scale human 
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cooperation other than indirect reciprocity. Of such alternative explanations, the most 
influential models were competitive altruism (Roberts, 1998, Barclay, 2006) and strong 
reciprocity (Gintis, 2000). According to the theory of competitive altruism, a cost 
associated with cooperation signals actors’ cooperativeness, then they can receive good 
reputation eliciting others’ help. On the other hand, the theory of strong reciprocity 
focuses on the importance of punishment against defectors to reduce their fitness. 
Although the evolution of punishment remains as a question because of its costliness for 
punishers, recent literature argued that this costliness can function as a signal of 
trustworthiness (Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016). In sum, it has already been 
suggested that a costly signal plays a crucial role in human cooperation. 
Nevertheless, the implications of the present study are largely distinct from 
these theories because they conceptualize altruistic behaviors (cooperation with good 
ones, and punishment against bad ones) themselves as signals. According to this 
conceptualization, to make bonds, all we humans have to do is to behave altruistically. 
However, it has been documented that many apparently wasteful behaviors, which 
cannot be equated with altruistic behaviors, also serve as commitment signals and 
facilitate dyadic cooperation by cementing interpersonal bonds (Frank, 1988; Nesse, 
2001; Yamaguchi, Smith, & Ohtsubo, 2015). The intSIG strategy likewise incorporates a 
signaling option independent of cooperation and allows players to maintain their good 
standing even when they withhold help. This idea is resonant with the notion of 
communicative cooperation coined by Noë (2006). Although it was proposed to 
underscore the importance of communication in animal cooperation, communications 
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via signals should be no less important for human beings, as we are not only a highly 
cooperative species but also an extremely communicative one. The present study shed 
light on the latter aspects of human beings to solve an enduring enigma, which is 
evolution of large-scale human cooperation. 
 
[Chapter 1, a part of Chapter 2 (except 2.3), Chapter 3 and a part of Chapter 4 (except 
4.1 and 4.2) is based on Tanaka, H., Ohtsuki, H., & Ohtsubo, Y. (2016). The price of 
being seen to be just: an intention signalling strategy for indirect reciprocity. 
Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 283(1835), 20160694.] 
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